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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a 
Utah banking corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 87007 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent, Commercial Security Bank, filed a Complaint for 
a declaratory relief in the District Court of Weber County dated 
the 11th day of March, 1986, asking the Court to interpret the 
meaning and effect of a Trust Deed Note, a Trust Deed, and a 
Letter Agreement dated July 19, 1967. Respondent Bank sent 
Interrogatories and then took the deposition of J. Merrill Bean, 
who is appellant dealer's Chief Executive Officer and by 
stipulation his deposition was published and made a part of the 
record. Respondent Bank then filed its Motion for Summary 
Judgment which was heard by the Honorable David E. Roth, District 
Judge, on the 2 2nd day of August, 1986. 
After a Motion for Clarification, the Court entered the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment in favor of 
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the respondent Bank in the sum of $24,000.00 dated the 10th day 
of December, 1986, and Notice of Appeal was filed January 8, 198 7. 
The Docketing Statement was filed the 28th day of January, 1987, 
and thereafter respondent filed a Motion for Summary Affirmance 
and appellant filed a Motion for Summary Disposition and both 
Motions were denied on the 25th day of February, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The essential facts on which the Court relied were 
stipulated by the parties: 
(a) Commercial Security Bank (hereinafter sometimes 
referred to as "Bank") began purchasing automobile contracts from 
Merrill Bean Chevrolet (hereinafter sometimes referred to as 
"Bean") under the terms of an agreement dated September 3, 1965 
(Bean Dep. Exh. 1). In the spring and summer of 1967 the parties 
negotiated the interest rate that would be applicable to a 
$400,000 loan to be used by Bean for construction of new 
dealership buildings (Bean Dep. Exh. 19; Exh. 5). The final 
agreement of the parties is set forth in the July 19, 1967 letter 
containing the following provisions: (Bean Dep. Exh. 5) 
The Bank agrees that the interest rate will be reduced 
to 6-1/2% in consideration of the maintenance by you of 
your commercial checking account with the Bank and the 
offering by you to its bank loan department of new and 
used automobile and truck contracts which meet the 
lending policy of said Bank... 
Under date of August 3, 19 67, Bean executed a Trust Deed 
Note providing for interest at 7% per annum secured by a Trust 
Deed of even date. (Dep. Exh. 6 amd 7) 
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(b) Approximately two years later the Bank changed its 
lending policies and refused to purchase any new or used 
automobile and truck contracts including those offered by Bean. 
Bean then discovered that all other banks in the Ogden area had 
the same policy as Commercial Security Bank and would buy its 
automobile contracts only if Bean maintained its commercial 
checking account at that Bank. Bean felt that it could not stay 
in business without a market for its contracts and therefore 
withdrew its commercial checking account from this Bank and 
placed it in another bank that purchased his automobile contracts. 
Plaintiff Bank then notified Bean that the interest rate on its 
real estate loan would increase from 6.5 to 7% as of January 1, 
1970. (Dep. Exh. 8) Bean objected to the increased interest 
rate and informed plaintiff that it would continue to pay 
interest at 6.5% under an established amortization schedule and 
when defendant completed its payments as originally determined 
the Bank claimed an additional amount to be due and owing because 
of the increase in interest rate now calculated to be 
approximately $24,000 plus interest from the 2 2nd day of August, 
1986, and these amounts are not in dispute. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Court had to accept and base its opinion upon Bean's 
Deposition testimony that all other banks in the area refused to 
buy Bean's automobile paper unless its Commercial checking 
account was also placed in that bank. 
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2. At the time the Letter Agreement was executed by Bean, 
the parties had a track record of almost two years of buying and 
selling dealer paper, during which time Bean had met the lending 
policies of the Bank. Bean was therefore justified in believing 
that his automobile paper could qualify for the 6.5 interest rate 
by simply continuing the course of dealing the parties had 
already established. The Bank's position that it could 
unilaterally change its lending policy and refuse to buy Bean's 
dealer paper thus increasing Bean's interest rate on the real 
estate loan is untenable because the dealer agreement of 
January 1, 1966 (Bean's Dep. Exh. 3) providing that the Bank was 
not obligated to buy Bean's paper was modified when the Bank tied 
Bean's commercial checking account, and the offering of dealer 
contracts as a condition precedent to the 6.5 interest rate. By 
refusing to accept any of Bean's dealer paper and giving Bean no 
terms upon which his dealer paper could qualify with the Bank, 
Bean was relieved of any obligation to leave its commercial 
checking account at the respondent Bank as a condition precedent 
to the 6.5 interest rate. 
3. The Bank's unilateral action made it impossible for Bean 
to meet the conditions which qualified it for the 6.5% interest 
rate and at the very least frustrated the very purposes for which 
Bean agreed to offer its contracts to the Bank and place its 
Commercial checking account with the Bank. 
4. The Bank Holding Company Act, while not directly 
applicable does reflect the public policy of the country, and was 
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POINT II 
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET WAS ENTITLED TO RELY ON 
THE COURSE OF DEALING BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND 
THE LENDING POLICIES OF THE BANK THAT WERE THEN 
IN EXISTENCE. 
By substantial repetition the bank emphasizes the rights of 
the parties regarding the sale and purchase of dealer paper are 
governed only by the agreement dated January 1, 1966 signed by 
the parties (Bean Dep. Exh. 2). However, the provisions of the 
letter agreement of July 19, 19 67 (Bean Dep. Exh. 5, Par. 8) are 
the most recent pronouncement of the parties1 intent, and modify 
the Dealer Agreement (Exhibit 2) because the offering of 
contracts in the letter is tied irrevocably to the maintenance of 
the commercial checking account and the interest rate on the real 
estate loan and Bean must offer contracts to the Bank to qualify 
for 6.5% interest. Our courts have constantly adhered to the 
primary rule in interpreting a contract, to determine what the 
parties intended by looking at the entire contract and all of its 
parts in relation to each other, "giving an objective and 
reasonable construction to the contract as a whole." Sears v. 
Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah 1982) 
To qualify for the lower interest rate, Bean had to maintain 
its commercial checking account at the Bank and in addition 
thereto, offer automobile and truck contracts "which meet the 
lending policy of said bank." For approximately two years the 
Bank had bought all of such contracts that met their lending 
policies. Bean could not qualify by just offering automobile and 
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truck contracts of any description. The agreement is clear that 
the contracts must meet the lending policies of the Bank. Thus 
the Bank is imposing upon Bean a standard with which the parties 
were familiar for approximately two years prior thereto and the 
parties continued to operate under that standard for 
approximately two more years until the Bank withdrew from the 
automobile market and refused to buy any more automobile paper 
including Bean's. The conclusion of the trial court that the 
Bank was entitled to withdraw from the market and discontinue the 
purchase of dealer contracts completely emasculates the intent of 
the parties. In Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 
P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985) the Supreme Court again confirmed that "a 
law generally imposes a duty to perform contractual obligations 
in good faith." In further refinement of that basic rule, the 
Court went on to state at page 10 37: 
Thus, an implied covenant of good faith forbids 
arbitrary action by one party that disadvantages the 
other. (Citations omitted) Accordingly, courts endeavor 
to construe contracts so as not to grant one of the 
parties an absolute and arbitrary right to terminate a 
contract. (Citations omitted) 
It was error for the trial court to conclude that the Trust 
Deed Note, the Trust Deed, and the Letter Agreement of July 19, 
1967 are the only documents to be considered in this integrated 
transaction. Obviously, the conduct of the parties and the 
understanding of the Bank as reflected in their own letter (Bean 
Dep. Exh. 12) reflect the intent and the purposes of the parties 
at the time the other documents were executed. I.M.A. Inc. v. 
Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc., 713 P.2d 882 (Colo. 1985). 
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In Shaeffer v. Kelton, 619 P.2d 1226 (N.M. 1980) the Court 
said at page 1229: 
The primary objective in construing a contract is 
not to label it with specific definitions or to look 
at form above substance, but to ascertain and enforce 
the intent of the parties as shown by the contents of 
the instrument. 
Where a written contract is ambiguous, uncertain or 
otherwise unclear, ...the intent of the parties may 
be ascertained by their language and conduct, the 
objective sought to be accomplished and all of the 
surrounding circumstances at the time the contract was 
executed. (Citations omitted) 
The phrase "which meet the lending policy of said bank" 
strongly implies that the Bank will have a lending policy in 
force at all times and it begs credulity to believe that Bean 
negotiated otherwise. The unspoken assumption was that, as in 
the past, Bean would offer paper that met the lending policies of 
the Bank but if the paper did qualify, the Bank would buy. 
In Davis v. Professional Business Services, 712 P.2d 511 
(Idaho 1985) the Court said at page 514: 
In every contract there exist not only the express 
promises set forth in the contract but all such implied 
provisions as are necessary to effectuate the intention 
of the parties, and as arise from the specific 
circumstances under which the contract was made. 
At Corbin on Contracts, §770, it is said: 
...a contractor whose promissory duty is subject to a 
condition precedent eliminates that condition if he 
unjustly prevents its fulfilment [sic]. This is true even 
though he has made no express promise that he will not 
prevent such fulfilment [sic]... (emphasis added) 
In a good many cases, however, the promissor's prevention 
of the fulfilment [sic] of the condition is itself regarded 
as breach of contract. The court finds that he has made 
an implied promise not to prevent or make more difficult 
the performance of the condition. 
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Otherwise, the Bank could reject Bean's paper by imposing 
onerous requirements, and thus force Bean to a 7% interest rate 
and it is not reasonable to believe that the parties negotiated 
with that thought in mind. The Bank's gain was the commercial 
checking account (paying no interest at the time) and the 
interest on deferred vehicle payments. Bean was assured a market 
for its automobile contracts and received a lower interest rate. 
Bean negotiated with respect to the prevailing conditions based 
on its experience with the Bank for the past two years. If the 
trial Court's interpretation of the contract language and the 
applicable law is correct, Bean was simply a puppet to be 
manipulated and positioned as the Bank saw fit. The Bank could 
reject Bean's paper at any time and thus increase the interest 
rate to 7% or alternativelyf the Bank could reject Bean's paper 
in 1969 and force Bean to find another financer for its paper, 
and continue with the 6.5 interest rate. Then if the Bank 
decided to enter the market again in 1976, it could once again 
demand that Bean offer its automobile paper that met the lending 
policies of the Bank or alternatively increase the interest rate 
to 7%. If the Bank's theory is correct, Bean could have offered 
to the Bank two automobile contracts and two truck contracts per 
year that met the lending policy of the Bank and maintained a 
small commercial checking account at the Bank and qualified for 
the 6.5 interest rate and such a result is equally absurd. The 
course of dealing between the parties and the reasonable 
expectations based thereon were an essential but unspoken part of 
the agreement. 
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In Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985) 
the Court dealt with the refusal of a lessor to consent to 
lessee's assignment of the lease. Viewing the lease as a 
contract, the Court quoted from Cohen v. Ratinoff (195 Cal. Rptr. 
84) as follows at page 844: 
...There has been an increasing recognition of an 
emphasis on the duty of good faith and fair dealing 
inherent in every contract... In every contract there 
is an implied covenant that neither party shall do 
anything which will have the effect of destroying or 
injuring the right of the other party to receive the 
fruits of the contract.... 
Bean had a right to expect that the Bank would buy its 
qualified paper and that it would not have to meet the 
requirements of other financers and the Bank had a right to 
expect that Bean would negotiate the majority of its contracts so 
that the paper would qualify under reasonable bank policies. 
(Bean Dep. P. 73, L. 2-9) Otherwise, the incentives the Bank 
held out to Bean to place its business with the Bank become 
absolutely meaningless. In this connection, the BanK's argument 
that 7% interest was a good rate for Bean is totally irrelevant. 
The only question is, did the Bank's change of policy prevent 
Bean from qualifying for the 6.5 interest rate which even the 
plaintiff must admit is $24,000 better than 7%. 
POINT III 
UNDER PRINCIPALS OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL, 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT DISGUISE THE NATURE OF 
ITS CONDUCT AS NOT BEING "WILLFUL." 
The Bank suggests that because Bean did not allege "malice" 
or "willfullness" Bean cannot complain. But willfullness does 
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not have to be an essential element in these cases. As Corbin 
has pointed out, and at 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver, §41 
at page 648, it is said: 
It is not essential to the creation of an equitable 
estoppel however that the parties sought to be estopped 
should have had an actual intent to deceive, defraud, 
or mislead. Nor is it essential that the 
representation or conduct relied upon be motivated by 
actual malice. An intention to influence the action of 
the particular person claiming the estoppel is not 
necessary in all cases. It is enough if there was a 
holding out to all who might have occasion to act on 
the existence of a certain state of facts which they 
might assume to be true and upon which they might act. 
And at §42, page 649, it is said: 
Although willfullness is sometimes mentioned as an 
element of equitable estoppel, the term "willfullness" 
is to be considered in context, and is generally used 
merely in respect to some or all of the elements of 
knowledge of rights or facts, the intent to influence 
the action of others, or intent to deceive. 
These principals were applied in Kojro v. Sikorski, 267 A.2d 
603 (Del. Super. 1970) where the Court said at page 607: 
Nor is it essential to create an estoppel that the 
parties sought to be estopped have had an actual intent 
to deceive or mislead...unintentional conduct which 
induces reliance of another to his detriment is 
sufficient to create an estoppel... 
POINT IV 
THE UNILATERAL CHANGE IN THE BANK'S LENDING 
POLICY MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR BEAN TO QUALIFY 
FOR THE 6.5 INTEREST RATE. 
To keep Bean's commercial checking account, the Bank was 
committed to a policy of purchasing his dealer paper regardless 
of what the Bank's policy may have been with other dealers. In 
Thornton v. Interstate Securities Co., 666 P.2d 370 (Wash. App. 
1983) the Court quoting from Brown v. Ehlinger, 156 P. 544 (Wash. 
1916) said at page 378: 
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Courts cannot set aside contracts because the performance of 
them becomes more difficult or more expensive than when they 
were entered into* If it were so, few contracts would 
survive the seasons of depression that periodically recur in 
the business world. 
The basic rule is set forth in Restatement of Contracts 
Second, §261 where it is said: 
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is 
made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of 
an event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption 
on which the contract was made, his duty to render that 
performance is discharged unless the language or 
circumstances indicate to the contrary. 
In Holmgren v. Utah Idaho Sugar Co., 582 P.2d 856 (Utah 
19 78) the Court said at page 861: 
The doctrine of impossibility of performance is one by 
which a party may be relieved of performing an 
obligation under a contract where supervening events, 
unforeseeable at the time the contract is made, render 
performance of the contract impossible. 
Further, in Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) the 
Court said at page 859: 
...One party to a contract cannot by willful act or 
omission make it impossible or difficult for the other 
to perform and then invoke the other's non-performance 
as a defense. 
In like manner, a party to a contract cannot make it 
impossible for the other party to perform and then claim damages 
for the nonperformance. In Howard v. Nicholson, 556 S.W.2d 477 
(Mo. App. 1977) the Court said at page 481: 
The doctrine of impossibility of performance means if a 
party by his contract, obligates himself to a 
performance which is possible to be performed, he must 
make it good unless his performance is rendered 
impossible by an act of God, the law, or the other 
party (emphasis added) (cases omitted). 
Once the Bank terminated the purchase of any dealer 
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contracts, there was no way for Bean to qualify for the 6.5% 
interest rate. Even had he left his checking account at the Bank ir 
and had he been able to market his contracts elsewhere, under the 
Bank's theory of the case, they could raise the interest rate, 
and they could have required him at any future time to offer his 
contracts to the Bank if the Bank re-entered the market to get 
the 6.5 interest rate, which is exactly what the Bank did. (Bean 
Dep. Exh. 11 and 12) 
POINT V 
THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH DEFENDANT APPELLANT 
ENTERED INTO THE LETTER AGREEMENT OF JULY 19, 
1967, WAS TOTALLY FRUSTRATED BY THE ACT OF 
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT. 
The basic rules on frustration are set forth at Restatement 
of Contracts Second, §266(1) and (2) where it is said: 
Where at the time a contract is made a party's principal 
purpose is frustrated without his fault by a fact of which 
he has no reason to know and the nonexistence of which is a 
basic assumption on which the contract is made no duty of 
that party to render performance arises unless the language 
or circumstances indicate to the contrary. 
Where at the time a contract is made a party's performance 
under it is impracticable without his fault because of a 
fact of which he has no reason to know and the nonexistence 
of which is a basic assumption on which the contract is 
made, no duty to render that performance arises unless the 
language or circumstances indicate the contrary. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the doctrine of 
frustation of purpose in Castagno v. Church, 52 P.2d 1282 (Utah 
1976) and in Bitzes v. Sunset Oaks Inc., 649 P.2d 66 (Utah 1982). 
The Court said at page 1384: 
The Courts have required a promissor seeking to excuse 
himself from performance of his obligations to prove 
that the risk of the frustrating event was not 
reasonably foreseeable and that the value of counter 
-14-
performance is totally or nearly totally destroyed, 
for frustration is no defense if it was foreseeable or 
controlable by the promisso>r, or if counter performance 
remains valuable. *$gT 
And in Everett Plywood Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 723 
(USCC 19 81) the Court said at page 7 28: 
The frustration doctrine has seen an increased 
application in private commercial contracts, and many 
courts have merged analysis under frustration with 
analysis under commercial impracticability...under one 
view frustration is applied to excuse performance 
where performance remains possible, but the value of 
the performance to at least one of the parties and the 
basic reason recognized by both parties for entering 
into the contract have been destroyed by a supervening 
and unforeseen event... The second view is similar to 
the above, but recognizes the fact that a contract 
never has a purpose, only the contracting parties have 
a purpose; the purpose of any one of these persons can 
be different than the purpose of the other. Under 
this second view, when the purpose of at least one of 
the parties is made worthless by a supervening event 
performance is excused, depending not on the 
foreseeability of the supervening event, but on which 
party the risk of the event's occurrence should be 
allocated. 
And at page 72 9: 
Under frustration analysis the Court is concerned with 
the impact of the event upon the failure of the 
consideration, while under impracticability the 
concern is more with the nature of the event and its 
effect upon performance. 
In 6 Corbin on Contracts, §1323, it is said at page 333: 
...it may be stated with very little qualification 
that if the plaintiff has himself made it impossible 
for the defendant to perform his promise, the 
non-performance is not an actionable breach of duty. 
No one doubts that it is unjust for the plaintiff to 
make performance impossible and then to complain of it. 
Indeed, action by the plaintiff that causes much less 
than objective impossibility will deprive him of a 
remedy and discharge the defendant from duty. If the 
plaintiff's action causes no more than a personal 
inability to perform on the part of the defendant, the 
latter is discharged. Nor is total inability 
necessary to such a result. If the plaintiff makes 
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performance by the defendant materially more difficult 
or expensive, the latter will be discharged. It is 
merely stating this rule in another form to say that 
the duty of a contractor is constructively conditional 
on the absence of material interference by the other 
party. 
And at §1353f page 457, it is said: 
When the purpose of one party is substantialy 
frustrated by the willful breach of the other, no one 
doubts that such frustration ought to discharge him 
from further duty. There are cases in which mutualy 
promises are wholly independent and unconditional; but 
they are not common. The same is true when the 
nonperformance by the other party though not willful, 
is caused by his subjective inability to perform. In 
such cases the frustrated party has an action for 
damages for breach; and we do not increase those 
damages by requiring him to proceed with his own 
uncompensated performance. The wrongful frustration of 
his purposes operates as his discharge from duty. 
(Emphasis Added) 
And at page 458, it is said: 
One who asserts frustration of purpose as a discharge 
from duty is seldom, if ever, asserting impossibility 
of performance of its own promise as a defense. ...in 
setting up frustration of purpose, he is asserting a 
different sort of defense. Some kind of contemplated 
performance may have become impossible; but it is not 
that promised performance from which he asked to be 
excused. 
And at §1354, page 459, it is said: 
If the supervening event that causes material 
frustration of purpose is willfully or negligently 
caused by one of the parties, he is the one on whom 
will be put the burden of the injury, including the 
burden of making compensation for the injuries of 
others. Often, however, such events occur without the 
fault of either party, causing losses and preventing 
gains. Who, then, must stand the loss or bear the 
disappointment. 
Unquestionably, it was to the Bank's advantage in the 
prevailing market to place its funds in more productive kinds of 
finance but the Bank had obtained the advantage of a noninterest-
-16-
bearing commercial checking account and had to know that the 
commercial practices of most other banks as well as their own 
would force Bean to withdraw its checking account. 
POINT VI 
THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 19 70 DID 
PROSCRIBE THE TYPE OF CONTRACT AND TYING 
ARRANGEMENT FORGED BY THE PLAINTIFF BANK 
IN THIS TRANSACTION. 
On December 31, 1970, Public Law 91-607 was passed by the 
Congress and became a law of the land now designated as 12 U.S.C. 
§1972 and provides in pertinent part as follows at subsection 
(1): 
A bank shall not in any manner extend credit/ lease or 
sell property of any kind, or furnish any service, or 
fix or vary the consideration for any of the foregoing, 
on the condition or requirement 
(C) That the customer provides some additional 
credit, property, or service to such bank, other 
than those related to and usually provided in 
connection with a loan, discount, deposit, or 
trust service; 
Costner v. Blount National Bank, 578 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 
1978) is exactly in point. The Court declared unlawful the type 
of tying arrangement regarding the offering of automobile paper 
to the bank as a condition for a loan to an automobile dealer to 
buy his partner's stock. On the other hand, Sterling Coal Co., 
Inc. v. United American Bank of Knoxville, 470 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1979) simply affirms that the requirement of the bank that 
the borrower's checking account be maintained at the bank as a 
condition for a loan is in the nature of traditional banking 
services contemplated by the conference report number 1747 91st 
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Congress 2nd Section (1970 p. 29) as set forth in plaintiff's 
Memorandum. Defendant is aware the act could not possibly be 
applied retroactivly to agreements made in 1967f but after the 
passage of the act in 1970f the Bank continued to require Merrill 
Bean to offer its automobile and truck contracts to the bank to 
qualify for the 6.5% interest rate (Bean Dep. Exh. 11 and 12). 
It is apparent from the documents that the Bank modified its 
position 18 0° because the Bank only required Merrill Bean to sell 
its automobile contracts to the Ban* to qualify for the 6.5 
interest rate without regard to the commercial checking account. 
There was no consistent requirement that Bean could meet to 
qualify for the 6.5 interest rate. Initiallyf Bean could not 
qualify because he removed his checking account from the Bank; 
eight years later, Bean could not qualify because he would not 
offer enough automobile and truck contracts after the Bank once 
again decided they were in the automobile paper business, (and 
again withdrew). 
CONCLUSION 
Bean had a right to rely upon the representations set forth 
in the commitment letter of July 19, 1967 and for approximately 
two years forwarded to the Bank its new and used automobile and 
truck contracts consistent with the policy previously established 
in the dealings between the parties and thus qualified for the 
6.5% interest rate. The Bank then rejected all of Bean's 
contracts, not because Bean wasn't willing to meet the lending 
policies of the Bank, but because the Bank no longer had a 
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lending policy for such contracts and Bean was forced to market 
its contracts elsewhere which in turn forced Bean to withdraw its 
checking account from the Bank. It was therefore the deliberate 
action and policy of the Bank that set in motion the chain of 
events about which the Bank now complains. Bean was ready, 
willing and able to qualify for the 6.5% interest rate but became 
disqualified the minute the Bank changed its policy and the Bank 
should therefore bear the risk and the loss. The judgment of the 
trial court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this day of April, 1987. 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
David E. Bean< 
Attorney for Appellant 
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50 South Main Street, Suite 2011 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STTE OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a ) 
Utah banking corporation, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT, AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET, ) Civil No. CV-095yfl47 
a Delaware corporation. ) 
Defendant. ) 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of the plaintiff having come 
duly before hearing before the Court, the Honorable David Roth, 
judge, presiding, on the 22nd day of August, 1986, and the plaintiff 
having appeared by and through counsel, Jeffrey Weston Shields, and 
the defendant having appeared by and through counsel, David E. Bean, 
Bean and Smedley, and the Court having heard arguments of counsel 
and having reviewed the briefs submitted by counsel, and having made 
a partial ruling from the bench at that time, and having taken other 
issues remaining under advisement, and having heretofore made and 
entered its written ruling on plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment herein, and being herein advised in the premises, the Court 
now makes and enters its; 
FINDINGS OF FACT AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff, Commercial Security Bank, loaned the sum of 
$400,000.00 to defendant Merrill Bean Chevrolet on or about July 19, 
1967 under the terms of a loan committment letter of that date. 
2. Said loan committment letter of July 19f 1967 provided 
for said loan of $400f000.00 at a 7% rate of interest with a 20 year 
amortization repayment program. One of the terms of that agreement 
provided specifically as follows: 
"The Bank agrees that the interest rate will be reduced to 
6.5 percent in consideration of the maintenance by you of 
your commercial checking account with the Bank and the 
offering by you to its Bankloan Department of new and used 
automobile and truck contracts which meet the lending policy 
of said Bank * * *." 
3. Subsequent to 1967, the plaintiff discontinued purchase 
of the automobile dealer contracts including those of the defendant. 
Defendant later withdrew its checking account from the plaintiff's 
bank and the plaintiff seeks to enforce the 7% rather than 6.5 % 
interest rate on the loan. 
4. The additional amount of payments remaining at the 
maturity of the obligation at the 7% interest rate total in excess 
of $24,000.00 and as prayed in the plaintiff's complaint. 
5. There is no evidence that the 7% interest rate is an 
unreasonable rate considering the time at which this loan was made 
and the circumstances under which the transaction was consumated. 
6. Defendant claims that the plaintiff's failure to accept 
defendant's dealer paper caused the defendant to shop elsewhere for 
banking services and that other banks would not finance defendant's 
dealer paper unless defendant transferred its checking account to 
that bank. Thus, defendant argues that it was forced to transfer 
its checking account and plaintiff then increased the interest rate 
to 7% on the loan. Defendant further argues that the plaintiff's 
refusal to accept defendant's dealer paper made it impossible for 
the defendant to perform the terms of the contract. 
7. In addition, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's 
refusal to accept the defendant's dealer paper made it impossible 
for the defendant to perform under the terms of the contract and in 
addition to the impossibility of performance argument defendant also 
argues that the plaintiff is equitably estopped from enforcing the 
higher 7% rate against it. Defendant also argues that the contract 
constitutes an unlawful "tying agreement" in violation on the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1970. 
8. This obligation is secured by a note and deed of trust 
upon the defendant's dealership property which, by its terms, 
affords the plaintiff a power of sale upon default. 
Having heretofore made its Findings of Fact, the Court, being 
duly informed in the premises, now makes and enters its; 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The loan committment letter of July 19, 1967 constitutes 
a contract between the parties which allows the plaintiff Bank to 
stop purchasing dealer contracts from the defendant if the Bank 
determines that such contracts no longer meet the lending policy of 
the Bank; the Bank changed policy to discontinue purchase of dealer 
contracts from any dealers which it was entitled to do under the 
contract. 
2. By terminating the purchase of the defendant's dealer 
contracts, the Court concludes that the Bank has not committed any 
act or acts which violate the terms of the contract. 
3. Under the terms of the contract, the Court finds that the 
plaintiff has the ability to unilaterally determine whether or not 
the defendant will qualify for the .5 % discount on the loan 
interest rate and therefore, the acts of the plaintiff in 
terminating the purchase of the defendant's dealer contract did not 
render the defendant's performance under the contract impossible. 
4. The Court finds that the terms of the July 19, 1967 loan 
committment letter do not render the contract an unlawful tying 
agreement under the terms of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1970, 
or the Sherman Act* 
5. The note and deed of trust along with the July 19, 1967 
committment letter are the three documents which comprise the 
entirety of this transaction/ and the Court finds that the same are 
integrated contracts containing all of the terms and agreements as 
between the partiesf and the Court therefore does not consider any 
other document or communication as modifying the terms of the 
agreement stated by said 3 documents. 
6. The plaintiff's complaint is not barred by the applicable 
Statute of Limitations. 
7. The plaintiff's complaint is not barred or limited by the 
equitable doctrine of Laches. 
8. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the sum prayed 
for in its complaint, and is entitled to a decree of this Court 
allowing it to foreclose the security interest set forth in the deed 
of trust which is an issue in this action as a note and a mortgage 
and to its attorney's fees and costs of court as therein provided or 
by power of sale. 
WHEREFORE, having hereinabove made and entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, judgment shall enter thereon 
accordingly. 
DATED this /ft day of December, 1986 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID E ROTH 
David Roth 
Second District Judge 
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS (A 2948) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK 
50 South Main Street, Suite 2011 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0815 
Telephone: (801) 53 5-1054 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a ) 
Utah banking corporat ion, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 1 
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET, 
a Delaware corporation. ! 
Defendant. 
I JUDGMENT 
i Civ i l No. CV-095jpTl47 
The motion of the plaintiff for Summary Judgment having come 
duly before the Court for hearing, the Honorable David Rothr Judger 
presiding, on the 22nd day of August, 1986, and the plaintiff having 
appeared by and through counsel, Jeffrey Weston Shields, and 
defendant having appeared by and through counsel, David E. Bean, 
Bean and Smedley, and the Court having heard agruments of counsel 
and having reviewed the briefs and memoranda of the parties filed 
herein, and being duly advised in the premises, and having 
heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and being prepared to rule thereon, it is now by the Court: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That plaintiff is awarded judgment as against the 
defendant in the sum of $24,455.16 principal, $5,710.96 of accrued 
interest from June 1, 1983 until October 2, 1986 and thereafter 
accruing at the rate of $4*75 per diem and the sum of $222.85 for 
advanced costs in reference to said deed of trust; 
2. For the additional sum of $5,000.00 as and for attorney's 
fees; 
3. For the further sum of $56.75 as costs of Court; 
4. Plaintiff is entitled to foreclose as against the 
defendant that certain deed of trust dated and executed on the 3rd 
day of August, 1967 and recorded on the records of the Weber County 
Recorder, State of Utah as Entry Number 494442, Book 872, Pages 271 
through 273 inclusive for the purpose of enforcing and collecting 
the sum of money awarded as judgment hereinabove, the same being 
secured by said deed of trust, and the Weber County Sheriff is 
authorized by these premises to conduct a sale thereon and to assess 
any deficiency thereafter due. 
DATED this lb day of December, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID E ROTH 
David Roth, 
District Judge 
David E. Bean 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK 
WASHINGTON BOULEVARD AT TWENTY-FIFTH STREET 
P. O. BOX 1480 • OGDEN, UTAH 84402 
July 19, 1967 
Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc. 
2626 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 
Attn: Mr, Merrill Bean 
Gentlemen: 
Commercial Security Bank, hereafter referred to as said bank, hereby 
commits to lend Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc. the sum of $400,000.00, 
TU interest, for a term of 15 years with a 20 year amortization repay-
ment program. This commitment is subject to the following terms: 
1. This loan to be secured by a first mortgage on approximately eight 
acres of land located at the northwest corner of Wall Avenue and Harris 
Street, Ogden, Utah and improvements to be constructed according to plans 
as presented to said bank, upon which said bank made its appraisal. 
2. A CLTA Title Insurance Policy issued by a.-title company acceptable 
to said bank, showing good and marketable title with no lien exceptions 
other than the bank's first mortgage and current years taxes, 
3. The loan of $400,000.00 to be based upon the following ratio: two-
thirds of the cost of the land and two-thirds of the cost of the improve-
ments. All personal property including office furniture and equipment, 
shop equipment, excluding carpets and drapes, will not be considered as 
part of the real estate improvements and will have to be paid in cash by 
Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc. 
4. Broad form fire and extended coverage insurance, at your expense, 
for the amount of the improvements with an insurance company satisfactory 
to said bank having a general rating of A and a financial rating of not 
less than BBB-f as rated by the Best Insurance Guide of 1966. A certificate 
of insurance from such a recognized company will be acceptable, properly 
endorsed with a loss payable clause in favor of the bank to insure its 
interest. 
5. A survey with a plat by a licensed engineer or surveyor of the State 
of Utah, shewing that all improvements are located on the property and a 
Certificate from proper authority showing that the same are built in accor-
dance with the zoning and regulatory authorities. 
6. The contractor and the written contract to be approved by the bank. 
Performance and payment bonds complying with the laws of Utah and approved 
by the bank's legal counsel shall be furnished by the contractor and written 
by a surety company approved by the bank. 
o 
% 
Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc. July 19, 1967 Page 2 
7. Disbursements from the loan proceeds for the construction of the 
improvements will be disbursed as the work progresses upon written evidence 
from the architect stating that said work is performed in a satisfactory and 
workmanlike manner and written evidence acceptable to said bank that no liens 
or unpaid bills are outstanding at the time of each disbursement. Disbursements* 
and construction will be also governed by the bank's standard building and loan 
agreement which you will be required to sign* 
8. The bank agrees that the interest rate will be reduced to 6^ 7. in con-
sideration of the maintenance by you of your commercial checking account with 
the bank and the offering by you to its Bankloan Department of new and used 
automobile and truck contracts which meet the lending policy of said bank.' As 
further consideration for the above, the bank agrees to waive all fees and 
charges in connection with this loan except title insurance, survey, recording 
and usual out of pocket expenses in connection with closing and would further 
extend prepayment privileges as follows: 
After 5 years from date, all or part of the principal of this note may 
be paid in advance without penalty. Within such 5 year period, the 
makers reserve the privilege, which shall NOT be cumulative from one 
year to another, to pay without penalty amounts which are greater, provided 
that the extra payments to principal are no more than 20% of the original 
principal balance in any one note year. The makers agree to pay a pre-
payment fee for amounts paid in excess of the 207» as follows: 17. of the 
original loan amount if paid during the first Syears of the loan. 
9. Written acceptance of this commitment is required within ten days after 
date of commitment. Said commitment will expire after sixty days if construc-
tion has not commenced on said improvements. Payments on note to commence six 
months after date construction begins. 
10. It is agreed that paragraph 8 of the bank's standard form trust deed, 
pursuant to your request, will be deleted. 
Sincerely, 
Jordon L. Belnap 
Vice -Pres ident 
GLB/mk 
The terms of this commitment are hereby accepted this X' 7 day of ,JL, // » 
1967. 
Merr i l l Beai^ChevroJ^t, Inc. 
BY: 
f w v n i D i i £ ^  
AQQjOOQ.00
 0 g d 6 1 X t U U n A u g u s t 3 # 19<&7_ 
For value received, I, we, or either of us. promise to pay to COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK of Ogden, Utah, or order, 
at its offices in Ogden, Utah, the principal sum of 
FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND and NO/100 Dollar*. -
with interest thereon from the date hereof until paid at the rate of 7 % per annum, both principal and Interest 
payable only in lawful money of the United States of America.
 m 
It is understood and agreed, however, that monthly installments of 
,. 1 10? OO * THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWO and NO/100 _ 
(I Jfj.uzyuu ) i —_ _ Dollars, 
Including interest, shall be paid on this note, the first of said Installments to be paid on the 1 5 t h day of 
klanuftxy , 19-5IL. and one of said installments to be paid on the 1 5 t h day of each 
and every month thereafter until the 1 5 t h flay
 0 f J tecember^ ^ 19J*?L, at which time 
the whole of the unpaid principal, together with the accrued Interest, shall be due; each of said monthly installments to be 
applied first to the payment of accrued interest on the unpaid principal, and the balance thereof to be credited on aaid principal. 
After ? years from date, all or part of the principal of this note may be paid in advance without penalty. _ 
Within such ... year period, the makers reserve the privilege, which shall NOT be cumulative from one year to 
another, to pay without penalty amounts which are greater, provided that the extra payments to principal are no more than 
2.Q % of the original principal balance in any one note year. The makers agree to pay a prepayment fee for 
amounts paid in excess of the ? " % as follows: 1 % of the original loan amount If paid during the 
first XKK years of the loan and *™*®. % of the original loan amount if paid during the next ± 2 years. 
And in case default be made in the payment of any of said Installments of principal or interest at the times and in the 
manner aforesaid, then such installment or payment, installments or payments, so in default, shall be added to and become a 
art of the principal sum, and from the date when each installment should have been paid until it is paid It shall bear the 
same rate of interest as the principal debt, being a part thereof; and at any time during such default in payment or in the 
performance of any agreement, covenant or condition in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its option, and 
without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and payable. 
In the event any installment of principal and interest shall remain unpaid for a period of 15 days after due, the under-
signed, at the option of the holder hereof and upon demand, agree to pay as a late charge a sum equivalent to two {!%) percent 
of the principal amount of such installment. 
If this note be placed for collection, either with or without suit, the undersigned jointly and severally agree to pay all 
costs and expenses thereof, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, guarantors and endorsers hereby severally waive presentment for payment, demand, notice of dishonor, protest 
and notice of protest and of non-payment of this note, and all defenses on the ground of any extension of the time of payment 
that may be given by the holder to them or any of them; and also agree that further payments of principal or interest in re-
aewal thereof shall not release them as makers, guarantors or endorsers. 
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET INCORPORATED 
BYr 
—/s /—JT-wr Bean, president 
ATTEST: 




Vust Deed Note GLB/kf 
nstallments including interest. KMl*0/ w i 
E: 70 5M Rev. 6/66 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK 
Ogden, Utah 
Ptaritd Q y t i d e / ^ f 
T.^ordcd i/X'-L-itraclga" 
Compered /Zj/jPago 
1^ 7 SEP 25 PM 3 59-
9 4 4 4 2 RUTH EAMES OLSEN 
^ -* "SPACE ABOVEBffflCOMipE mOQm£Q< 
WV REODJ&IlfiOBDER'S USE 
/.A 
3rd 
TRUST DEED ^ -
With Assignment of Rents / «r 
A u g u s t day of THIS TRUST DEED, made this 
between — MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET INCORPORATED,^ C o r p o r a t i o n 
whose address it „ __ 
19 67 
as TRUSTOR. 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a Corpora•tion_ as TRUSTEE, and 
as BENEFICIARY 
WITNESSETH That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST. WITH POWER OF SALE, the 
following described property, situated in Weber .._. County, State of Utah: 
A part of the Northwest Quarter of Section 5, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, of the Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, United States Survey: Beginning at a point on the West line of 
Wall Avenue 524.9 feet North 89° 46' 20" West and North 0° 58' East 392.0 feet from 
the Southeast corner of said Northwest £Xiarter Section, said point being at Ogden City 
Engineer's "A" Station 27+94.00 and "B" Station 76+40.20; running thence North 89° 46* 20" 
West 691.0 feet; thence North 0° 58' East 5C1. 5 feet; thence South 89° 46* 20" East 691.0 






^Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way. easements, rents, issues, 
fcjroftts. income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed 
rtfith said properly, or an> part thereof. SUBJECT. HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and 
conferred upon lieneficiarv to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness and all other lawful charges evidenced by a pro-
missory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of % 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 * 0 0 made by Trustor, payable to 
the order of lieneficiarv at all times, in the manner and with Interest as therein set forth, and any extensions and/or renewal* 
or modifications thereof. (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein contained: (3) the payment of auch ad-
ditional loans or advances as hereafter ma> be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured hv thin Trust heed; and (4} the pavment of all sums expended or adraneed by 
Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together *ith Interest thereon as herein provided. 
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED. TTRUSTOR AGREES: 
1, To keep said property in good condition and repair, not to remove or demolish any building thereon; to complete or 
restore promptly and in good and workmanlike manner aim building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon; 
to comply with all lawa. covenants and restrictions affectir-i: said property; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to 
commit, suffer or permit any act upon said property in violat ion of Jaw; to do all other acts which from the character or use 
of said property may be reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general; and. If the loan 
secured hereby or any.part thereof is being obtained for the purpose of financing construction of Improvements on said property. 
Trustor further agrees: 
(a) To commence construction promptly and to pursue *ame with reasonable diligence to completion in accordance with 
plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and 
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at a*H times during construction. 
Trustee, upon presentation to It of an affidavit signed >•?" Beneficiary, setting forth facts showing a default by Trustor 
under this numbered paragraph, is authorized to accept a* true and conclusive all fact* and statements therein, and to act 
thereon hereunder. 
J. To provide and maintain insurance against such casualties as Beneficiary may require. In an amount, for such term, 
and In a company or companies satisfactory to Beneficial- with loss payable clauses In favor of and In a form satisfactory 
to Beneficiary In «he event of loss or damage. Trustor sha-'J give immediate notice to Beneficiary. Beneficiary may makt 
proof of loss and settle and adjust all claims thereunder applying the proceeds at its option, to reduction of the amount 
due hereunder, or 10 the restoration or repair of the pro:,***rty damaged Payment of such loss may be made directly to 
Beneficiary. In the event of the refusal or neglect of Tru^'or to provide insurance or to maintain same, or to renew same 
in a manner satisfactory to Beneficiary, then Beneficial may itself procure and maintain such insurance and charge the 
cost thereof to Trustor under the provisions of paragraph 7 hereof. Beneficiary shall not be required to accept or ap-
prove any policy of insurance or any renewal of an ex:s:*Jng policy, which is not delivered to it prior to 30 days before the 
expiration date of existing coverage even though the sanv* may be otherwise satisfactory to beneficiary. 
3 To deliver to, pay for and maintain with Beneficiar"1 until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, such evidence 
of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of t." ;e or policies of title Insurance and any extensions or renewals 
thereof or supplements thereto. 
4 To appear in and defend any action or proceeding pi-rl>orting t o affect the security hereof, the title to said property, or 
the rights or powers of beneficiary or Trustee, and shoulf. Beneficiary or Trustee elect to also appear in or defend any such 
action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, inc. ~dirig cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable 
sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee 
5, To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all tax^-t and assessments affecting said property, including all assessments 
upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and c marges for water, appurtenant to or used in connection with said 
property; to pay, when due, all encumbrances,, charges, ar.'. liens with interest, on said property or any part thereof, which at 
any time appear to be prior or superior hereto, to pay a. costs, fees, and expenses of this Trust. 
6 Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do a : v act as herein provided then Beneficiary or Trustee, but without 
tbligation so to do and without notice to or demand upor Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof, 
may Make or do the same in such manner and to such # .• lent as either may deem necessary to protect the security hereof. 
Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon s a . : property for such purposes. Commence, appear in and defend any 
action or proceeding purporting to affect the security her* 'A or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay. purchase, 
contest, or compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien -»hich in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior 
hereto, and in exercising any such powers, incur any lability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion It mi) 
deem necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of tlr *. employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees 
7. To pay immediately and without demand ail surr \ expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with interest 
from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10 ' . > I>er annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be 
secured hereby. 
%—Not to make any voluntary inter vivos transfer fi the premises or any part thereof without first obtaining the 
ff, written consent of the Beneficiary. A»v such transfer, it the Beneficiary shall not so consent, shall constitute a default 
'^,4 under the terms of this instrument and the note it secure- and Beneficiary may cause same to be foreclosed, and the premises 
provisions hereof. 
/ /y  t  t  f t i  I t i 
/ ' / sold, according to law and the 
/V IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED TJ HAT: 
9 Should Bald property or any part thereqf be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemnation 
proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner. Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation, 
awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall t<e entitled at its option to commence, appear in and prosecute In 
its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any '-ompromise or settlement, in connection with such taking or 
damage Ail such compensation, awards, damages, rights "f action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of 
fire and other insurance affecting said properly, are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may. after deducting therefrom 
all its expenses, including attorney's fees, apply the same "» any indebtedness secured hereby Trustor agrees to execute 
such further assignments of any compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee 
may require. 
10. At any time and from time to time upon written request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and presentation of 
this Trust Deed and liu? note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance for cancellation and retention), without affect-
ing the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby. Trustee may (a) consent to the making of 
any map or plat of said property, (b) join in granting uny easement or creating an) restriction thereon, tc) join in any 
subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust D««-d or the lien or charge thereof; (d) reconvey. without warrant), 
all or any part of said property. The grantee in any reconveyance ma> be described as "the person or persons entitled 
thereto", and the recitals therein of any matters or fact* shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Trustor 
agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph. 
11 As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns t<» Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all rents, 
issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property located thereon 
ntil Trustor shall default In the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement 
hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect all sui h rents. Issues, royalties and profits earned prior to default as 
they become due act payable If Trustor shall default a« aforesaid. Trustors right to collect any of such moneys shall cease 
and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without taking possession or the property affected hereb). to collect all rents, 
royalties, Issues, and profits Failure or discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any such 
moneys shall not in any manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authorit) to 
collect the same Nothing contained herein, nor the excr< IH« of the right by Beneficiar) to collect, shall be. or be construed 
to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy. leuHi- or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a subordina-
tion of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option 
12 Upon default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary nia> at any time without notice, either in person, by agent, or 
by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereb) consenting to the appointment of Beneficiary as such receiver), 
and without regard to the adequacy of any security for !>»*• Indebtedness hereb) secured, enter upon and take possession 
of said property or any part thereof, and in its own name NO*- or otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits. Including 
I
those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less cowl* and expenses or operation and collection. Including reasonable 
fattorney's fees, upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine. 
I 13. The entering upon and taking possession of salt! property, the collection of such rents, issues, and profits, or the 
nYoceeds of fire and other Insurance policies, or compciiHution or award* for any taking or damage or said property, and 
the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waite an> default or notice of default hereunder or 
Invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice. 
14. The failure on the pari of Beneficiary to promptly enforce anv right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of 
aucb right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default ahall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default. 
15 Time Is of the essence hereof Upon default u> Trustor in the pavment of anv Indebtedness secured hereby or In the 
performance of any agreement hereunder, all »ums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option 
of Beneficiar) In the event of such default. Beneficing may execute or ruuse Trustee to execute a written notice of 
default and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisf) the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice 
for record In each county wherein said property or som«< part or parrel thereof Is situated Beneficiary also shall deposit 
with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing expenditures secured hereby. 
, 16. After the lapse of such time as may then be required by law following the recordation of said notice of default, 
and notice of default and notice of sale having been given as then required by law. Trustee, without demand on Trustor, 
shall •***' * a , d Prr>l>tfrtv o 0 the date and at the time and place designated lit said notice of sale, either as a whole or in 
(krMle> parcels, and In such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to direct the order 
*|tlch such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall he sold), at public auction to the highest 
bidder* the purchase price payable In au/ul money of the United States at the time of sale. The person conducting the 
aaie i"*?' tor a n v r a u H e he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until it shall be completed and. in v\ery 
such •'ttse' n o t i c e u f pontponemunt shull be given by public declaration thereof by such person at the time and place last 
^uted for the sale, provided, if the sale is postponed for longer than one day beyond the day designated In the notice 
of i»i*'e- notice thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver 
to th* pur-chaser its Deed conve\ing said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The 
recll"'* *n t n e Deed of any mutters or fact shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including 
Iten^firtary. may hid at tiie Hale Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of I X) the costs end expenses of 
e x e n K i « g the power of sale and of sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred hv the 
Truf'1'* a n d t n e Beneficiary but not to exceed ten « 10*, ) per cent of the unpaid indebtedness at the*time of such sale with 
the 'minimum totul of said fees not to be less than $250.00; « 21 cost of any evidence of title procured In connection with 
such **'e an<* revenue stumps on Trustee's Deed; (.1) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with 
accrued interest at 10'; per annum from dale of expenditure; (41 all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the re-
mainder, if any. to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee. In its discretion, may deposit the balance 
of s*Kn proceeds with the County Clerk of the county in which the sale took place 
17 Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured 
hereeV immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure oi 
morU**e s o n r e a ' property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedings all costs and expense! 
incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court. 
IS. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder 
of e*ch county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee From the time the sub-
stitution i s f e d for record, the new trustee shall succeed to ail the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee named 
ner<>tu or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, and notice thereof shall 
D e fit-en and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
IS. This Trust Deed shall apply to. inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees. 
a(jniiii$trators. executors, successors and assigns. All obligations ot Trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term 
"Be*t*'ic'ary shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured hereby In this Trust Deed, 
whenever the text so requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes 
the |dural. 
+t) Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, la made a public record as 
provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Trust Deed or of 
any *vt | o n i n which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee. 
•I. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah, 
+1 The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be 
-ma.ll*«l t o him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
IN WITNESS. WHEREOF THE Trustor has caused these presents to be executed the day and year first above written. 
^
liX{L(
* 3' • „ MERRILL BEKN CHEVROLET INCORPORATED 
Secretary-
;^.-.'. /^.. Treasurer... 
INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
STATE of 
COVNTY OF I 
On the day of _ 19 , personally appeared before m* 
ln«» *i<ner of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
Notary Public 
Residing at 
My commission expires: 
CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
UTAH j 
_WEBER._"1 . . . . { " • 
f On the _ 3 ? £ day of A u g u s t 10_i=LZ.. personally appeared before me .*?;. M* j e a n 
Ajv*> ^ £ £ 3 L . K * ^ A . ^ . h e £ f L . . who being by me duly *worn did »ay that they are the president and 
g f iTS of — 
C*«VTY OF 
„ I _ Secre tary / re se l l vJ l^o f M E I * * a L L BEAN CHEVROLET INCORPORATED 
•ration, and that said instrument was signed In behalf of said < 
mn, and said ^,„-JL^.Jl' . . p e a r *
 a n d _ 
lb*.* acknowledge to^ ifte. that said corporation executed the same. 
coloratio . *o   ***<*     corporation by authority of a resolution, of It* Board of 
D l f ^ f » .  . i  W r - ^ i » * l i . - 9 S 5 L n  . J e r r Y K * W h i t e h e a d and each of 
*• ^ 
_ f ^ ^ - J / „ <^U-e-a &*&&-*/ 
— " V* »V- • - - Notary Public 
r. .-s . n : - : Residing at Oqdffn , U t a h 
•4. Cbmmiss ion E m p i r e s • 
REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE 
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full) 
TO. TRUSTEE 
The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness secured by the within Trust 
Deed Said note, together with all other indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed has been fully paid and satisfied; and 
you are hereby requested and directed, on payment to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, 
to cancel said note above mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed delivered to you 
herewith, together with the said Trust Deed, and to reconvey, without warranty, to the parties designated by the terms 
of said Trust Deed, all the estate now held by you thereunder. 
Dated 1 0 -











C O M M E R C I A L ^ J b U U K l l I JD/YfSIJV Mcmb,rF.DJ 
ROY C. NELSON 
Senior Vice President 
Credit Administration 
December 26, 1979 
Mr. J. Merrill Bean 
Merrill Bean Chevrolet 
3535 Wall Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Dear Merrill: 
Thank you for your letter requesting that we review the interest 
rate charged against your real estate loan. A search of our 
records indicates that during the years 1977 and 1978, when you 
were selling the required number of contracts to qualify for a 
reduction, that the interest rate was not reduced from 1% to 6*5%. 
We have today issued a credit to your account in the amount of 
$3,146.07 to correct the matter. Included in the credit adjust-
ment is the computation of interest for 1979 at 7% on a lower 
principal balance. 
If you have any questions regarding this transaction, please call 
me. I appreciate your calling this matter to my attention. 
May I take this opportunity to wish you and your associates a 
happy and successful new year. 
Sincerely, / 
Roy t. Nelson 
Senior Vice President 
enclosure 
c#-^ „> r;,w s»uth Salt Lake Citv. Utah 64111 
COMMERCIAL b t L U K U I JBAJTMJV ^ «-*-™-^  
fi0Y C NELSON 
$enJor Vice President 
Credit Administration 
f ^ DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 
/JL 
January 18, 1980 
Mr. J. Merrill Bean 
Merrill Bean Chevrolet 
3535 Wall Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Dear Merrill: 
Thank you for the note of January 4, 1980 expressing your appreciation 
for the credit memo. However, the last sentence concerns me that we might 
have a misunderstanding. When the Real Estate loan was originated, one 
of the conditions of the loan was that the interest rate would be reduced 
to 6*5% in consideration of the maintenance by you of your commercial checking 
account with the bank, and the offering by you to our Bankloan Department 
a minimum of 50% of controlled contracts of new and used automobile and 
truck contracts which meet the lending policy of the bank. 
Although at the present time, and for some time, we regret that you have 
not maintained your commercial checking account with us, we did reduce the 
interest on your Real Estate loan for the years 1977 and 1978 from 7% to 
6^ % based on the purchase of contracts from your company. As I explained 
in my letter of December 26, 1979, we did not reduce the 1979 interest 
rate because we had not purchased significant contracts from your company, 
but did adjust the principal balance for that year. 
I hope 1980 will be a banner year for your company. 
jcerely, 
Roy cQNelson 
Senior Vice President 
sh 
C#«#» nt Pint Knuth- Salt LaJcM Citv Utah Mill 




THIS AGREEMENT e n t e r e d i n t o a t Ogden, Weber County, 
U t a h , ^ J M > ^ i g » M i ^ ^ r f ^ u i M i ) i by and 
between Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc.
 f h e r e i n a f t e r 
c a l l e d " D e a l e r " , and COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, Ogden f Utah , 
h e r e i n a f t e r c a l l e d "Dank", and i s i n t e n d e d t o govern the 
purchase by Bank from D e a l e r of motor v e h i c l e i n s t a l l m e n t 
s a l e s e c u r i t y agreement s r e p r e s e n t i n g the s a l e by D e a l e r 
t o p u r c h a s e r s of new and u s e d motor v e h i c l e s . 
The p a r t i e s m u t u a l l y a g r e e a s f o l l o w s : 
**mmmi**Fim UlUUL 11UU UUdULl 11UUI LJJ11L torn 
I 111 i 1 IIJJL1LJ IHJIllfcHUl 
by Dealer covering the sale of new and used vehicles executed 
on forms acceptable to the Bank, and at current rates of 
discount from time to time established by the Bank. 
liaigiiHi (Ulna iimilL LU U1ULUIUIL Ul pii 
2. The purchase price to be paid by the Bank for each 
such agreement shall be the total unpaid contract balance 
shown thereon discounted at the rate currently in effect. 
The purchase price shall be paid to the Dealer, or at 
Dealerfs option, credited to his account upon proper execution 
of the assignment of the agreement and delivery of the 
document to the Bank. The Bank thereafter shall succeed 
to all the right, title, estate and interest of the Dealer 
under said agreement. The Dealer shall furnish evidence 
Df insurance by a company acceptable to Bank protecting 
the Bank and the Dealer as their interests may appear 
covering comprehensive and collision ($100.00 deductible 
minimum). The Bank at its option, may procure such 
insurance and charge the same against the contract*balance. 
3. If the total unpaid contract balance shown on the 
agreement at the time of purchase shall exceed the amount 
for which such contract was purchased by the Bank, plus the 
amount of the discount, the excess shall be credited to the 
Dealerfs reserve account with the Bank. This account shall 
also be credited with Dealer's insurance participations and 
charged with unearned insurance participations resulting from 
cancellation of policies prior to their expiration dates. 
Thereafter on a monthly basis, except as hereafter provided, 
and if Dealer be not in default on any obligation to the 
Bank, howsoever arising, the Bank shall remit to the Dealer 
from the reserve account, the amount by which the credit 
balance insaid account shall, at the date of payment, exceed 
one-half of one percent (.5%) of the aggregate unpaid balance 
of all security agreements purchased from Dealer. This 
reserve account, however, is hereby continually pledged 
and assigned for all of Dealer's obligations to the Bank, 
now or hereafter existing, absolute or contingent including 
Dealerfs share of any unearned finance charge refunded to 
purchasers of vehicles upon prepayment of agreements purchased 
hereunder and any finance charge unpaid if a motor vehicle 
be repossessed, with the right in the Bank accordingly to 
apply s u ch reserve or any part thereof. 
4. The Bank shall make all collections under agree-
ments which it shall purchase and shall effect repossessions 
when necessary, all at its expense, provided, however, that 
whenever any of the following shall occur: 
(a) If any agreement purchased by the Bank is in 
violation of any law, public policy, or regulation 
of any city, county, state or federal governmental 
agency or is held to be not legally enforceable 
for any reason whatsoever. 
(b) If any of the covenants, warranties or representa-
tions made by the Dealer in the assignment of a 
security agreement are breached, violated or held 
to be untrue. 
(c) If any loss to the Bank shall occur under any 
agreement as a result of failure of the Dealer 
properly to complete the registration of any 
vehicle showing the interest or lien of the Bank. 
(d) If possession of a motor vehicle, the contract or 
agreement covering which is purchased by the Bank 
hereunder, was obtained by any fraudulent scheme, 
trick or device on the part of the buyer thereof 
the particular security agreement less any unearned finance 
charges and the Bank will thereupon reassign said agreement 
to the Dealer. 
t^ way elect and in particular may apply the Dealerfs 
reserve account to any direct or contingent obligation of 
the Dealer in favor of the Bank. 
9* Dealer agrees to pay and discharge all costs, and 
expenses that may arise from enforcing this agreement or 
any rights arising or created hereunder in favor of the Bankf 
including reasonable attorneyfs fees. 
10. The waiver by Bank of any breach or default of 
the terms, covenants or agreements of this agreement shall 
be limited to the particular instance and shall not operate 
as a waiver of any further breach or default of the terms, 
covenants or agreements contained herein. 
11. If any provision of this agreement shall be 
invalid, the other terms and conditions shall remain in 
full force and effect. 
12. This agreement shall be irrevocable until all 
agreements purchased hereunder by Bank from Dealer shall 
have been paid in full to Bank, and shall inure to the 
benefit of the respective heirs, personal representatives, 
successors and assigns of the parties hereto, and any 
company or organization subsidiary to or affiliated with 
Bank to whom Bank may assign this agreement and/or cause 
to purchase agreements from dealer as herein set forth. 
That, except as herein otherwise specifically provided, 
Dealer hereby waives notice of non-payment, repossession 
and all other notices to which Dealer might otherwise be 
entitled by law. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the p a r t i e s have caused t h e s e 
p r e s e n t s t o be e x e c u t e d t h e day and year f i r s t above 
w r i t t e n . 
Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc. 
v idua1 o r f i rm name) 
T i t l e 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK 
By /- •o \-<^.i .<-/-
/ //// Title 
CONTRACT PURCHASED TERMS 
Current year model (new) 
Current year model (used) 
Previous Year Model 
Z & 3 previous year model 
h & 5 previous year model 












95% ( Used Car 
( 
90% ( Guide 
( 
90% ( Wholesale 
( 










Minimum service charge $15 — Minimum payment $25 
If Dealer gives a warranty on automobiles older than previous 
year's model, a copy of such warranty must accompany contract at 
time of purchase and cover automobile if repossessed. 
TYING ARRANGEMENTS 12 USCS § 1972 
RESEARCH GUIDE 
Federal Procedure L Ed: 
Banking and Financing, Fed Proc, L Ed, §§ 8:768, 8:772. 
Am Jur: 
54 Am Jur 2d, Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade 
Practices §§ 425.5, 426. 
Law Review Articles: 
Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries. 86 Yale L J 1. 
§ 1972, Certain tying arrangements prohibited; correspondent ac-
counts 
(1) A bank shall not in any manner extend credit, lease or sell property of 
any kind, or furnish any service, or fix or vary the consideration for any of 
the foregoing, on the condition or requirement— 
(A) that the customer shall obtain some additional credit, property, or 
service from such bank other than a loan, discount, deposit, or trust 
service; 
(B) that the customer shall obtain some additional credit, property, or 
service from a bank holding company of such bank, or from any other 
subsidiary of such bank holding company; 
(C) that the customer provide some additional credit, property, or 
service to such bank, other than those related to and usually provided in 
connection with a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service; 
(D) that the customer provide some additional credit, property, or 
service to a bank holding company of such bank, or to any other 
subsidiary of such bank holding company; or 
(E) that the customer shall not obtain some other credit, property, or 
service from a competitor of such bank, a bank holding company, of 
such bank, or any subsidiary of such bank holding company, other than 
a condition or requirement that such bank shall reasonably impose in a 
credit transaction to assure the soundness of the credit. 
The Board may by regulation or order permit such exceptions to the 
foregoing prohibition as it considers will not be contrary to the purposes of 
this section. 
(2)(A) No bank which maintains a correspondent account in the name of 
another bank shall make an extension of credit to an executive officer or 
director of, or to any person who directly or indirectly or acting through 
or in concert with one or more persons owns, controls, or has the power 
to vote more than 10 per centum of any class of voting securities of, 
such other bank or to any related interest of such person unless such 
extension of credit is made on substantially the same terms, including 
interest rates and collateral as those prevailing at the time for compara-
ble transactions with other persons and does not involve more than the 
normal risk of repayment or present other unfavorable features. 
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(B) No bank shall open a correspondent account at another bank while 
such bank has outstanding an extension of credit to an executive officer 
or director of, or other person who directly or indirectly or acting 
through or in concert with one or more persons owns, controls, or has 
the power to vote more than 10 per centum of any class of voting 
securities of, the bank desiring to open the account or to any related 
interest of such person, unless such extension of credit was made on 
substantially the same terms, including interest rates and collateral as 
those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with other 
persons and does not involve more than the normal risk of repayment or 
present other unfavorable features. 
(C) No bank which maintains a correspondent account at another bank 
shall make an extension of credit to an executive officer or director of, 
or to any person who directly or indirectly acting through or in concert 
with one or more persons owns, controls, or has the power to vote more 
than 10 per centum of any class of voting securities of, such other bank 
or to any related interest of such person, unless such extension of credit 
is made on substantially the same terms, including interest rates and 
collateral as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions 
with other persons and does not involve more than the normal risk of 
repayment or present other unfavorable features. 
(D) No bank which has outstanding an extension of credit to an 
executive officer or director of, or to any person who directly or 
indirectly or acting through or in concert with one or more persons 
owns, controls, or has the power to vote more than 10 per centum of 
any class of voting securities of, another bank or to any related interest 
of such person shall open a correspondent account at such other bank, 
unless such extension of credit was made on substantially the same 
terms, including interest rates and collateral as those prevailing at the 
time for comparable transactions with other persons and does not 
involve more than the normal risk of repayment or present other 
unfavorable features. 
(E) For purposes of this paragraph, the term "extension of credit" shall 
have the meaning prescribed by the Board pursuant to section 22(h) of 
the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 375b) [12 USCS § 375b], and the 
term "executive officer" shall have the same meaning given it under 
section 22(g) of the Federal Reserve Act [12 USCS § 375a]. 
(F)(i) Any bank which violates or any officer, director, employee, agent, 
or other person participating in the conduct of the affairs of such 
bank who violates any provision of section 106(b)(2) [para. (2) of this 
section] shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 
per day for each day during which such violation continues: Provided, 
That the agency having authority to impose a civil money penalty 
may, in its discretion, compromise, modify, or remit any civil money 
penalty which is subject to imposition or has been imposed under 
such authority. The penalty may be assessed and collected by the 
464 
T Y I N G A R R A N G E M E N T S 12 USCS § 1972 
Comptroller of the Currency in the case of a national bank, the Board 
in the case of a State member bank, or the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation in the case of an insured nonmember State bank, by 
written notice. As used in this section, the term "violates" includes 
without any limitation any action (alone or with another or others) 
for or toward causing, bringing about, participating in, counselling, or 
aiding or abetting a violation. 
(ii) In determining the amount of the penalty the Comptroller of the 
Currency, the Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
as the case may be, shall take into account the appropriateness of the 
penalty with respect to the size of the financial resources and good 
faith of the bank or person charged, the gravity of the violation, the 
history of previous violations, and such other matters as justice may 
require. 
(iii) The bank or person assessed shall be afforded an opportunity for 
agency hearing, upon request made within ten days after issuance of 
the notice of assessment. In such hearing, all issues shall be deter-
mined on the record pursuant to section 554 of title 5, United States 
Code [5 USCS § 554]. The agency determination shall be made by 
final order which may be reviewed only as provided in subsection (iv). 
If no hearing is requested as herein provided, the assessment shall 
constitute a final and unappealable order. 
(iv) Any bank or person against whom an order imposing a civil 
money penalty has been entered after agency hearing under this 
section may obtain review by the United States court of appeals for 
the circuit in which the home office of the bank is located, or the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 
by filing a notice of appeal in such court within twenty days from the 
service of such order, and simultaneously sending a copy of such 
notice by registered or certified mail to the Comptroller of the 
Currency, the Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
as the case may be. The Comptroller of the Currency, the Board or 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as the case may be, shall 
promptly certify and file in such court the record upon which the 
penalty was imposed, as provided in section 2112 of title 28, Ur" ed 
States Code [28 USCS § 2112]. The findings of the Comptroller o * the 
Currency, the Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
as the case may be, shall be set aside if found to be unsupported by 
substantial evidence as provided by section 706(2)(E) of title 5, United 
States Code [5 USCS § 706(2)(E)j. 
(v) If any bank or person fails to pay an assessment after it has 
become a final and unappealable order, or after the court of appeals 
has entered final judgment in favor of the agency, the Comptroller of 
the Currency, the Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, as the case may be, shall refer the matter to the Attorney 
General, who shall recover the amount assessed by action in the 
465 
12 USCS § 1972 BANKS AND BANKING 
appropriate United States district court. In such action the validity 
and apropriateness of the final order imposing the penalty shall not be 
subject to review. 
(vi) The Comptroller of the Currency, the Board and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation shall promulgate regulations establish-
ing procedures necessary to implement this section, 
(vii) All penalties collected under authority of this section shall be 
covered into the Treasury of the United States. 
(G)(i) Each executive officer and each stockholder of record who 
directly or indirectly owns, controls, or has the power to vote more 
than 10 per centum of any class of voting securities of an insured 
bank shall make a written report to the board of directors of such 
bank for any year during which such executive officer or shareholder 
has outstanding an extension of credit from a bank which maintains a 
corresponding account in the name of such bank. Such report shall 
include the following information: 
(1) the maximum amount of indebtedness to the bank maintaining 
the correspondent account during such year of (a) such executive 
officer or stockholder of record, (b) each company controlled by 
such executive officer or stockholder, or (c) each political or 
campaign committee the funds or services of which will benefit 
such executive officer or stockholder, or which is controlled by 
such executive officer or stockholder; 
(2) the amount of indebtedness to the bank maintaining the 
correspondent account outstanding as of a date not more than ten 
days prior to the date of filing of such report of (a) such executive 
officer or stockholder of record, (b) each company controlled by 
such executive officer or stockholder, or (c) each political or 
campaign committee the funds or services of which will benefit 
such executive officer or stockholder; 
(3) the range of interest rates charged on such indebtedness of such 
executive officer or stockholder of record; and 
(4) the terms and conditions of such indebtedness of such executive 
officer or stockholder of record. 
(ii) The appropriate Federal banking agencies are authorized to issue 
rules and regulations, including definitions of terms, to require the 
reporting and public disclosure of information by any bank or 
executive officer or principal shareholder thereof concerning any 
extension of credit by a correspondent bank to the reporting bank's 
executive officers or principal shareholders, or the related interests of 
such persons. 
(H) For the purpose of this paragraph— 
(i) the term "bank" includes a mutual savings bank; 
(ii) the term "related interests of such persons" includes any company 
controlled by such executive officer, director, or person, or any 
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political or campaign committee the funds or services of which will 
benefit such executive officer, director, or person or which is con-
trolled by such executive officer, director, or person; and 
(iii) the terms "control of a company" and "company" have the same 
meaning as under section 22(h) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 
375b) [12 USCS § 375b]. 
(Dec. 31, 1970, P. L. 91-607, Title I, § 106(b), 84 Stat. 1766; Nov. 10, 
1978, P. L. 95-630, Title VIII, § 801, 92 Stat. 3690; Oct. 15, 1982, P. L 
97-320, Title IV, Part A, § 410(f), Part B, §§ 424(c) in part, (d)(ll) , (e) in 
part, 428, 96 Stat. 1520, 1523, 1526.) 
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References in text: 
"This section", referred to in this section, is section 106 of Act Dec. 
31, 1970, P. L. 91-607, Title I, 84 Stat. 1766, which appears as 12 
USCS §§ 1971 et seq. 
Amendments: 
1978. Act Nov. 10, 1978 (effective 120 days after enactment on 11/10/ 
78, as provided by §2101 of such Act, which appears as 12 USCS 
§ 375b) designated existing provisions as para. (1), in para. (1) as so 
designated, redesignated former paras. (l)-{5) as subparas. (A)-(E), 
respectively, and added para. (2). 
1982. Act Oct. 15, 1982, in para. (2), in subparas. (A), (B), (C), and 
(D), inserted "or to any related interest of such person", in subpara. 
(E), substituted "the meaning prescribed by the Board pursuant to 
section 22(h) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 (U.S.C. 375b)," for "the 
same meaning given it in section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act", in 
subpara. (F), in cl. (i), inserted ": Provided, That the agency having 
authority to impose a civil money penalty may, in its discretion, 
compromise, modify, or remit any civil money penalty which is subject 
to imposition or has been imposed under such authority" and substi-
tuted "may" for "shall" following "The penalty", and in cl. (iv), 
substituted "twenty days from the service" for "ten days from the 
date", in subpara. (G), substituted cl. (ii) for one which read: "Each 
insured bank shall compile the reports filed pursuant to subparagraph 
(G)(i) and forward such compilation to the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency in the case of a national bank, the Board in the case of a State 
member bank, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the 
case of an insured nonmember State bank." and deleted cl. (iii) which 
read: "Each insured bank shall include in the report required to be 
made under subsection (k)(l) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 
U.S.C. 1817(k)(l)) a list by name of each executive officer or stock-
holder of record who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or has the 
power to vote more than 10 per centum of any class of voting securities 
of the bank who files information required by subparagraph (G)(i) and 
the aggregate amount of all extensions of credit by correspondent banks 
to such executive officers or stockholders of record, any company 
controlled by such executive officers or stockholders, and any political 
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